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Abstract. Research suggests that ambiguous figure reversal is associated with creativity, but current 
evidence relies on subjective self-report that is difficult to quantify (Wiseman, Watt, Gilhooly, Georgiou, 
2011 British Journal of Psychology 102 615–622). Using quantifiable measures of both phenomena 
we confirm this claim. We also find that participants studying science experience much more frequent 
reversal—a novel and intriguing finding.
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1 Introduction
Recently Wiseman et al (2011) presented evidence for a relationship between creativity 
and ease of reversal of an ambiguous figure. As they note, this conclusion is limited by their 
self-report measure: participants were shown an ambiguous figure and asked to rate how easy 
they found it to see the opposite interpretation. Most participants rated this as easy or very 
easy (95% in study 1, 85% in study 2), suggesting that they had no baseline against which 
to judge their relative reversal ability. Individual differences therefore might reflect factors 
like self-confidence rather than reversal ability. We replicate the finding using quantifiable 
measures of reversal. We also extend the work by using more than one type of ambiguous 
figure. Ambiguous figures fall into three distinct categories, in which reversal is of figure and 
ground, content, or perspective (Long and Toppino 2004). See figure 1 for exemplars.
2 Method
2.1 Participants
Participants were thirty-eight secondary school students (nineteen boys) between the ages of 16 
years and 18 years 4 months (mean age 17 years 2 months, SD = 6 months). Participants studied 
between 3 and 5 subjects, classified as sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, and maths) or arts 
and social sciences (English, languages, music, history, media studies, etc). Sciences comprised 
36% of subjects. An academic preference score from +1 (all sciences) to –1 (all arts and social 
sciences) was constructed for each participant by adding +1 for each science and –1 for each 
non-science subject divided by the total number of subjects studied (mean = – 0.278, SD = 0.53).
Figure 1. The three ambiguous figures used in this study.
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2.2 Ambiguous (figures task)
This task included three ambiguous figures shown in figure 1. Images were approximately 
12 cm × 12 cm, presented separately. Participants were asked to look at the image for 1 min, 
and to inform the experimenter when they noticed a change in their interpretation, making a 
dash in the test booklet for each subsequent reversal.
2.3 Pattern meanings test (Wallach and Kogan, 1965)
This test comprises eight abstract patterns (figure 2) presented individually on 20 × 14 cm 
laminated cards. Participants were asked to write down “all of the things you think it could 
be, or that it reminds you of ”. One point was given for each novel interpretation, excluding 
variations on the same object (eg ‘glasses’ and ‘sunglasses’).
Figure 2. Stimuli for the pattern meanings test, adapted from Wallach and Kogan (1965).
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The second aim is to examine how both factors relate to choice of academic discipline, on 
the intuitive hypothesis that studying science requires or fosters the ability to switch between 
alternative interpretations of a stimulus. Cognitive or perceptual styles have been found 
to co-vary with academic discipline in previous research. Phillips et al (2004) found that 
social scientists were more susceptible to the Ebbinghaus visual illusion than mathematical 
scientists, an effect that extends to other cultures (Doherty et al 2008).
We measured the time it took participants to experience initial reversal of ambiguous 
figures and the frequency of reversal during 1 min. Creativity was measured with Wallach and 
Kogan’s (1965) pattern meanings test. Participants were shown abstract patterns and asked 
what they could be (figure 2). This is analogous to the phenomenology of reversal, in which 
a stimulus can suddenly be seen in a new way.
3 Results
3.1 Pattern meanings task
Participants produced roughly two alternative interpretations for each pattern, summed to 
produce a creativity score (roughly normally distributed, range 2 to 32, mean = 16.7, SD = 6.58).
3.2 Ambiguous figures task
Mean times to first reversal and the frequencies of reversal for the three figures are shown 
in table 1. Participants took longer to initially reverse the Necker cube than the vase–faces 
(Friedman, Z = 2.67, p < 0.01); no other differences were significant. Frequencies of reversal 
did not differ between figures ( |2 = 1.42, p = 0.49), and were substantially correlated (table 2).
3.3 Comparison of measures
Creativity scores were significantly related to overall frequency of reversal (rs = 0.42, 
p < 0.01). There was also a trend towards a relationship between creativity scores and time 
to first reversal (rs = – 0.30, p = 0.07). Both overall frequency of reversal and time to first 
reversal were significantly associated with academic preference (rs = 0.39 and rs = – 0.36, 
respectively, both ps < 0.05).
Table 1. Mean time to first reversal and frequency of reversal for the three ambiguous figures. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses.
Ambiguous figures Time to first reversal/s Number of reversals per minute
Vase–faces 12.4 (19.0) 13.9 (17.5)
Duck–rabbit 14.7 (18.2) 12.3 (15.6)
Necker cube 16.9 (16.6)  8.2  (9.9)
Table 2. Correlations between frequency of reversal for the three ambiguous figures, creativity, and 
academic preference.
Frequency                             Academic preference
vase–faces duck–rabbit Necker cube
Creativity 0.39* 0.20 0.49** 0.15
Frequency
vase–faces 0.78*** 0.50*** 0.40*
duck–rabbit 0.35* 0.42**
Necker cube 0.14
Note. Correlations are Spearman’s ts, rs : * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2 shows relationships between creativity, academic preference, and frequency 
of reversal of individual figures. The relationship between frequency and creativity scores 
is largely determined by the Necker cube and vase–faces, whereas that between frequency 
and academic preference by the vase–faces and duck–rabbit.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between reversal frequency and creativity when 
participants are split by the mean into high and low creativity groups (producing between 17 
and 32, or 16 or fewer interpretations on the pattern meanings test, respectively). More creative 
participants reversed each figure more frequently.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between reversal frequency and academic preference 
when participants are grouped into science and arts/social science groups (preference scores 
between 0 and 1, or less than 0, respectively). Participants with a preference for science 
subjects reversed figures more frequently than participants preferring arts or social 
sciences.
Figure 3. Frequency of reversal for participants with high and low creativity scores.
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Figure 4. Frequency of reversal according to participants’ academic preferences.
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4 Discussion
We examined Wiseman et al’s (2011) claim that creativity and ambiguous figure reversal 
are related, substituting their subjective rating of reversal difficulty with more quantifiable 
measures. Frequency of reversal was substantially related to our measure of creativity. 
We therefore conclude that the claim is broadly correct.
Most surprisingly, participants’ academic preferences were related to reversal. 
Faster initial and more frequent reversals were associated with a preference for science. 
Whether this is fostered by studying science or influences an individual’s initial choice 
to study it warrants further investigation.
The differential pattern of relations between variables conforms to whether a figure 
involves reversal of perspective (Necker cube), of meaning or content (duck–rabbit), or 
reversal of both (vase–faces). The relationship between reversal and creativity is strongest 
for the two figures involving reversal of perspective. The relationship between reversal and 
academic preference is strongest for the figures involving reversal of meaning.
The creativity relationships may be due to our creativity measure, which requires imposing 
a three-dimensional imagined shape onto a series of two-dimensional lines, followed by a 
different shape for each subsequent interpretation. This is intuitively similar to Necker-
cube reversal. On the other hand, Wiseman et al (2011) measured creativity by asking 
participants to think of alternative uses for a brick or a paperclip (Guilford et al 1978). 
This can be thought of as seeing a new meaning (use) for objects, and performance was 
associated with their measure of ease of reversal of Jastrow’s classic duck–rabbit figure.
This allows a prediction: the alternative uses task should also associate with a preference 
for science. The ability to see new meanings in stimuli is certainly a key skill in scientific 
reasoning, and may be why academic preference associates most highly with reversal of 
meaning.
Future studies must go beyond such broad intuitions to examine how creativity and 
academic preference relate to other factors that influence reversal. Recent developmental 
research suggests mental imagery and executive inhibition are key component skills (Wimmer 
and Doherty 2011). The three types of figure may draw differentially on each skill. Clearly our 
creativity measure heavily involves mental imagery. Plausibly scientific reasoning requires 
good inhibitory ability, but to our knowledge this has yet to be studied.
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